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ABSTRACT
We propose a method called Fast and Realistic Attacker
Modeling and Evaluation (FRAME) that can reduce pes-
simism in static noise analysis by exploiting temporal logical
correlation of attackers and using novel techniques termed
envelopes and σ functions. Unlike conventional pruning-
based approaches, FRAME efficiently considers all relevant
attackers, thereby producing more realistic results. FRAME
was tested with complex industrial design and successfully
reduced the pessimism of conventional techniques by 30.4%
on average, with little computational overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
B.7.2 [Integrated Circuits]: Design Aids—verification
General Terms
Signal integrity
Keywords
Static noise analysis, capacitive crosstalk
1. INTRODUCTION
Addressing noise issues in digital circuit design has be-
come critical, due to the combined effects of technology
scaling, high clock frequencies, and increased use of noise-
sensitive dynamic circuits to fulfill high-speed requirements.
Without thorough verification, noise effects will degrade the
functionality, performance and reliability of a circuit. Most
industrial static noise analyzers assume that all attackers
switch simultaneously in the same direction, which frequently
produces unrealistic results. Thus, pessimism reduction in
static noise analysis has gained much attention [1–13,16–20].
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Most existing techniques exploit temporal and/or logical
correlations among attackers. Early approaches [2,4,17,19]
focused on timing correlations, which can be estimated by
propagating timing windows through static timing analysis
(STA). However, considering only timing correlations is in-
sufficient. For instance, temporally uncorrelated attackers
can still be under a logical constraint that prevents them
from switching in the same direction. Moreover, overlook-
ing the interplay between temporal and logical correlation
could give non-conservative timing results [6]. Consequently,
combined approaches that consider both temporal and log-
ical correlations step-by-step [1,5,7–12,18,20] or simultane-
ously [3,6,13,16] have been suggested.
Most previous approaches aim at either pruning out in-
valid attackers [1,3,6,10,11,13,16,20] or selecting appropri-
ate attackers and constructing a set of valid attackers [7–9].
The problem of handling temporal and logical correlations is
in general NP-hard [5], and these combinatorial approaches
depend critically on various techniques for alleviating the
hardness, such as SAT solvers [3, 11, 13, 16], ATPG/path-
sensitization [1,6,10,18], ROBDDs [7,9,20], and other heuris-
tics [12]. Nevertheless, many techniques still suffer from
limited scalability to large-scale circuitries. Moreover, not
considering all attackers can sometimes increase pessimism,
deviating from the common belief that pessimism can always
be reduced by pruning attackers (e.g. see Section 3).
The proposed FRAME method is related to existing ap-
proaches in that temporal and logical correlations are ex-
ploited together. On the other hand, FRAME is unique in
the following aspects: First, FRAME implicitly considers
all attackers, rather than pruning out or selecting attackers.
Second, FRAME exploits a simple, graphical representation
of attacker waveforms for exploring the search space with-
out explicit enumeration of all possibilities. Taken together,
FRAME runs fast and produces realistic results since the ef-
fect of every relevant attacker is simultaneously considered.
In a verification flow, FRAME would be positioned as
a first-level noise estimator that can quickly examine large
circuits and identify noise issues for more accurate analy-
sis. Toward that end, FRAME exploits novel techniques
termed envelopes and σ functions, which enable us to com-
pute the worst-case combined waveform of multiple attack-
ers and their alignment information in time polynomial to
the number of attackers, under reasonable assumptions on
attacker waveform shapes and secondary attacker effects.
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Figure 1: Attacker modeling.
We extensively tested FRAME with 201 circuits extracted
from a millon-gate 90-nm industrial design and discovered
that FRAME can reduce pessimism by 30.4% on average,
compared with conventional pruning-based techniques, with
little computational overhead. Based on our promising re-
sults, we believe that FRAME can be a practical and pow-
erful tool for facilitating the entire verification flow.
2. PROPOSED METHOD
2.1 Attacker Modeling and Assumptions
Consider a chain of buffers and inverters whose nets (at-
tackers) are capacitively coupled with a common net (vic-
tim), as shown in the left pane of Fig. 1(a). The input to the
first gate in the chain is referred to as the chain head. As the
chain head (and its downstream gates thereafter) switches,
the victim, which is assumed initially static, can be affected
and dynamically change. We are interested in how individ-
ual attackers interact to create a composite waveform at the
victim. Of particular interest is the worst-case combination
that contains a peak of the largest magnitude.
Since the attackers on the chain are temporally and log-
ically correlated, the worst-case search problem becomes
computationally hard [5]. To alleviate that, we break the
chain, apply separate input to each attacker block to induce
an attacker bump, and estimate the original combined wave-
form using these bumps, as in Fig. 1(a). Temporal corre-
lation among attackers is considered using timing windows,
each of which is obtained through STA and provides the ear-
liest and latest arrival time of an attacker bump, as shown
in Fig. 1(b). Logical correlation is considered using the po-
larity of attacker bumps.
For computational efficiency, FRAME assumes the follow-
ing: (A.1) A single attacker waveform is piecewise linear and
unimodal. It is thus modeled by a triangular wave; (A.2)
The input slew of each attacker is fixed within its timing
window; (A.3) The effects of secondary attackers (i.e. an
attacker of an attacker) are marginal and can be ignored.
Based on (A.1-2), we model each attacker bump by a tri-
angle with four stationary parameters, as shown in Fig. 1(c):
△(t; l, p, e,m) =


m
p−l
(t− l), if l ≤ t < p;
−m
e−p
(t− e), if p ≤ t < e;
0, otherwise.
(1)
For simplicity, we set l = 0 and approximate fi(t), the wave-
form of attacker i, by △(t; 0, pi, ei,mi). The timing window
of attacker i is represented by interval [ai, bi], where ai and
Algorithm 1 The FRAME method
input: Θ = (p, e,m, a, b) for each attacker bump ⊲ Section 2.1
output: W ∗ and S∗ ⊲ Section 2.2
1: procedure Frame
2: for each attacker do
3: Construct envelopes E ⊲ Section 2.3
4: Derive σ function from E ⊲ Section 2.4
5: Represent E and σ by vertices ⊲ Section 2.5
6: end for
7: Calculate W ∗ and S∗ ⊲ Section 2.6
8: end procedure
bi indicate the earliest and latest arrival time, respectively.
For convenience, let Θi = (pi, ei,mi, ai, bi) for attacker i.
2.2 The Objective and Overview of FRAME
Given a chain of n attackers, let W be the magnitude
of the composite waveform of the n attackers and si the
time amount by which attacker fi(t) should be shifted to
produce W . Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} and assume a function
J : Rn → R, where R denotes the set of all real numbers.
FRAME is to determine the worst-case magnitude
W
∗ = max
t
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
fi(t− si)
∣∣∣∣∣ , J(S) (2)
and an instance of the corresponding attacker alignment
S∗ = argmax
S
J(S) (3)
under the constraints that si ∈ [ai, bi] for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
UsingW ∗, we would be able to identify noisy nets that need
further analysis. High-accuracy simulators can be invoked
with the alignment information S∗.
Eqs. (2-3) might be solved by conventional search algo-
rithms or by a dynamic programming argument if discrete-
time waveforms are assumed. However, such approaches
would be overkill given that only an instance of the worst-
case solution would suffice for typical static noise analysis.
Furthermore, the uniqueness of the solution to the above
equations not being guaranteed, such approaches may incur
excessive running time with little gain. FRAME provides a
rapid solution to the above equations by following the proce-
dures outlined in Algorithm 1. Note that FRAME typically
needs to be invoked twice per chain, once for each direction
(i.e. rising and falling) of the chain head input, since the
attacker parameters change according to this direction.
2.3 Tracing the Worst Case By Envelopes
We utilize the notion of envelopes to determine efficiently
the magnitude of a worst-case composite waveform. Infor-
mally, an envelope is a waveform that represents the maxi-
mum or minimum voltage observable at each time point, as
an attacker waveform is slid over its timing window. The
idea of using an envelope has some resemblance to the work
by [15], but the envelope we propose is more general and
powerful in that both maximum and minimum values can
be tracked and that alignment information is accompanied.
For a more precise definition, consider Fig. 2(a) that shows
the trajectory of an attacker waveform over its timing win-
dow. Assume that f(t) = △(t; 0, p, e,m) and that f can be
shifted by s ∈ [a, b]. For the sake of explanation, also as-
sume that b < a+e. Consider the probe point at time t = tx
in Fig. 2(a). The vertical arrow then indicates the range of
voltage values that can be measured at tx, as s varies from
a to b. The maximum voltage observable at tx is
m
p
(tx− a),
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Figure 2: Concept of envelopes.
Table 1: The meaning of outer/inner envelopes.
Wave Outer envelope Inner envelope
Positive max trace: Fig. 3(a) min trace: Fig. 3(b),(c)
Negative min trace: Fig. 4(a) max trace: Fig. 4(b),(c)
which happens when s = a. Similarly, the minimum voltage
should be 0, which is achieved when tx ≤ s ≤ b. (Recall
that we are varying s over fixed tx.)
Above we assumed that tx is in zone 2 or a ≤ tx ≤ b;
by varying tx over the entire time horizon and recording the
maximum and minimum at every tx, we obtain envelopes.
As summarized in the table in Fig. 2(b), the formula to
compute the minimum and maximum values observable at
tx varies depending upon where tx is placed. The second
line of the table lists the formula to get the maximum for
each time zone. For the minimum, the relative locations of
b and a + e also matters. The third line shows only the
formula to calculate the minimum for b < a+ e; otherwise,
the minimum is always zero. The entries for zones 1 and 8
are not shown in the table since the values are all zero.
Now we formally define two types of envelopes — outer
and inner envelopes. The outer envelope Eouter of attacker
f(t) represented by △(t; 0, p, e,m) is a function of time t
parameterized by Θ = (p, e,m, a, b):
Eouter (t;Θ) =


m
p
(t− a), if a ≤ t < a+ p;
m, if a+ p ≤ t < b+ p;
−m
e−p
(t− e− b), if b+ p ≤ t < b+ e;
0, otherwise.
For a positive waveform (m > 0), the outer envelope is the
trace of the maximum, as shown in Fig. 3(a). For a negative
waveform (m < 0), the outer envelope is the trace of the
minimum, as shown in Fig. 4(a). The inner envelope of an
attacker can have one of the two shapes, depending upon
the parameters and timing window used:
Einner (t;Θ) =
{
△ (t; b, b+ pδ, a+ e,mδ) , if b < a+ e;
0, otherwise.
where δ , a+e−b
e
. The inner envelope of a positive waveform
traces the minimum of the waveform. If b < a+ e, the inner
envelope has a triangular shape as shown in Fig. 3(b); other-
wise, the inner envelope is always zero as shown in Fig. 3(c).
The inner envelope of a negative waveform traces the max-
imum of the waveform as shown in Fig. 4(b) and 4(c). Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the meaning of outer and inner envelopes
for positive and negative waveforms.
Table 2: The σ functions we use (δ , a+e−b
e
).
For Eouter(t): For Einner(t):
σ(t;Θ) =

a, if t < a;
t, if a ≤ t < b;
b, otherwise.
σ(t;Θ) ={
b, if t < b+ pδ;
a, otherwise.
σ(t;Θ) ={
b, if t < b;
a, otherwise.
See Fig. 5(a) 5(b): b < a+ e 5(c): b ≥ a+ e
2.4 Recording Shift Amount by σ Function
The FRAME method provides not only the magnitude
of a worst-case combined attacker waveform but also the
corresponding attacker alignment. Using this alignment in-
formation, high-accuracy simulators can be invoked for fur-
ther analysis. Each FRAME envelope is accompanied by
the time-shift information named the σ function. Recall in
Fig. 2(a) the maximum voltage at tx is achieved when at-
tacker f is shifted by s = a. Informally, the σ function is to
record this shift information for every point on an envelope.
The shift amount s that makes the voltage at tx maximum
or minimum is sometimes not unique. For instance, the
minimum at tx can be achieved as long as tx ≤ s ≤ b in
Fig. 2(a). This fact can be represented more formally by Rσ,
a binary relation from R to [a, b] such that Rσ = {(t, s)|f(t−
s) = E(t)} for t ∈ R and s ∈ [a, b]. That is, for any given t,
Rσ provides the set of all values by which an attacker should
be shifted to have the maximum or minimum value recorded
on its envelope. The gray areas and nonzero lines in each
subplot of Fig. 5 represent the Rσ relation for each of the
envelopes shown in Fig. 3 and 4.
Since we aim at finding some (not all) instances of the
worst-case alignment, we do not use Rσ as it is but derive a
function σ : R → [a, b] from the Rσ relation. It is this σ(t)
function that is used in the downstream procedures. The
thick bold line segments drawn in Fig. 5(a) represent our
choice for σ(t) for the outer envelopes presented in Fig. 3(a)
and 4(a). Note that this arbitrary choice does not compro-
mise the correctness of the solution we find; introducing σ
functions helps enhance computational efficiency by limiting
the search space. Fewer solutions would be found by adopt-
ing σ, but the number of solutions is not important in our
context. The σ function we adopt for the inner envelopes
presented in Fig. 3(b) and 4(b) is indicated by dark lines in
Fig. 5(b). Finally, the thick bold lines in Fig. 5(c) repre-
sent the δ function of our choice for the inner envelopes in
Fig. 3(c) and 4(c). Table 2 summarizes the formulae for the
σ functions we use.
2.5 Representing Envelopes and σ Functions
The piecewise linear assumption enables us to represent
an envelope only by the vertices joining line segments. For
instance, the outer envelope drawn in Fig. 3(a) can be repre-
sented by using the four vertices shown in Fig. 6(a). In this
manner, we can avoid handling an envelope in its continuous
form; any intermediate values can be deduced from the ver-
tices used. Similarly, we can save the need to manipulate the
whole σ function by annotating each vertex with its σ value.
Each vertex in our representation thus has four attributes
denoted by tuple (t, V, [sL, sR]), where t and V represent the
time and voltage associated with the vertex; sL and sR are
the left and right limits of σ at t: sL = limǫ→0− σ(t + ǫ)
and sR = limǫ→0+ σ(t + ǫ). Storing both limits is to han-
dle the discontinuities appearing in the σ functions for in-
ner envelopes. FRAME represents each attacker waveform
and its timing window compactly by using these annotated
vertices. Fig. 6 shows the representations of the outer and
inner envelopes presented in Fig. 3. The representations of
the envelopes in Fig. 4 are similarly defined and not shown.
2.6 Calculating the Worst-case Waveform
The last step of FRAME is to manipulate envelopes and σ
functions to determine the worst-case composite waveform
and attacker alignment. Since the envelope of an attacker
waveform represents the maximum or minimum voltage for
each time point, adding the envelopes of multiple attackers
reveals the maximum or minimum voltage of the combined
waveform of these attackers. More precisely, the worst-case
magnitude W ∗ of a combined waveform is given by
W
∗ = max
t
{|Emax(t)| , |Emin(t)|} (4)
where Emax(t) and Emin(t) represent the envelopes to find
the maximum and minimum voltage, respectively. For a
positive (negative) attacker, its outer (inner) envelope rep-
resents the maximum value. Thus, Emax(t) is simply the
sum of all positive outer and negative inner envelopes. Sim-
ilarly, Emin(t) can be calculated by adding all positive inner
and negative outer envelopes. More precisely,
Emax(t) =
∑
i∈I+
Eouter(t;Θi) +
∑
i∈I−
Einner(t;Θi) (5)
Emin(t) =
∑
i∈I+
Einner(t;Θi) +
∑
i∈I−
Eouter(t;Θi) (6)
where I+ = {i|mi ≥ 0}, I
− = {i|mi < 0} and |I
+|+|I−| = n.
The worst-case alignment s∗i of attacker i is given by
s
∗
i = σi (t
∗) , where (7)
t
∗ = argmax
t
{|Emax(t)| , |Emin(t)|} (8)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Using the representation described in
Section 2.5, we can add envelopes simply by manipulating
the attributes of the vertices used in the representation. We
use the following example for further explanation.
Example 1. Fig. 7(a) shows two attacker waveforms in
the left column. They are converted to the vertex-based en-
velope representations in the right column and then added
to Emax(t). Fig. 7(b) lists the attribute of each vertex
before addition. An empty vertex attribute tuple of an at-
tacker means that this vertex does not appear in the rep-
resentation of the attacker. Before addition, these empty
attributes get filled with values linearly interpolated using
existing vertex attributes. For instance, Fig. 7(c) shows
that the v2 voltage of attacker 1 is set to the average volt-
age of v1 and v3 marked by hexagons; the sL and sR of the
new v4 vertex is set to the average of sR of v3 and sL of
v5 marked by a rectangle and an ellipse, respectively. In-
terpolated entries are marked with asterisks. The ‘Sum’
column shows the result of addition. The voltage of a ver-
tex in the result is the sum of the voltage attributes of the
vertices of attackers 1 and 2. Fig. 7(d) shows Emin(t) ob-
tained by switching the roles of outer and inner envelopes.
Since |Emin| > |Emax|, W
∗ = |Emin| = 3. Note that there
are three instances of t∗. Fig. 7(e) presents the worst-case
waveform f1(t− s
∗
1) + f2(t− s
∗
2), where s
∗
1 = σ1(t
∗ = 5) = 1
and s∗2 = σ2(t
∗ = 5) = 2. The other cases for t∗ = 3 and 4
are not shown due to the space limit. ✷
The addition algorithm used in the above example can
easily be extended to adding multiple envelopes: Given n
envelopes, we first sort the vertices of all envelopes with
respect to t and merge them into a single master vertex
list. We annotate each vertex in the list with a chain of n
attribute tuples, one for each attacker envelope. For each
attacker, we examine its chain of attribute tuples and in-
terpolate any empty entries. Finally, for each vertex in the
master list, we compute its voltage attribute by accumu-
lating the voltage over the chain of attribute tuples. The
worst-case complexity of the algorithm to add multiple en-
velopes is O(nlogn+ 4n · n+ 4n · n) = O(n2).
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
FRAME was implemented with C++ and was tested with
various synthetic and real circuits. Experiments were per-
formed on a 64-bit 2.66-GHz Linux machine with 8-GBmem-
ory. For comparison, we used a commercial static noise an-
alyzer that employs conventional pruning techniques [1,3–5,
9, 17–19]. Throughout the experiments, FRAME remained
conservative and did not produce optimistic noise figures.
The runtime overhead was less than 1% in all test cases.
We first use a synthetic circuit shown in Fig. 8(a) to ex-
plain the pessimism reduction mechanism FRAME relies
on. To generate reference data, SPICE is invoked (without
breaking the chain) for simulating the victim waveform when
the chain head falls. Using the timing windows and triangu-
lar parameters obtained through STA, FRAME predicts the
alignment of individual attackers, while the commercial tool
we used performs pruning. The result is shown in Fig. 8(b),
which compares the accuracy of FRAME and the pruning-
based commercial tool with respect to SPICE. The peak
voltage SPICE, FRAME and the competing tool report are
0.3390V, 0.3398V and 0.4144V, respectively. FRAME thus
reduces pessimism by 18.0% with respect to the competing
tool. The FRAME waveform resembles the SPICE curve
more closely, producing 93.6% smaller mean squared error.
This difference originates mainly from the fact that the in-
dustrial tool eliminates the second attacker because the di-
rection of the second attacker bump is the opposite to that
of the others. In other words, retaining the second attacker
cannot be the worst-case since removing it induces larger
noise, and the commercial tool prunes it. In contrast, the
effect of all attackers are considered by FRAME.
We extensively tested FRAME with 201 circuits extracted
from a 90-nm network processor design with approximately
1 million gates. Fig. 9(a) compares the performance of
FRAME with that of the commercial tool in terms of the
worst-case peak voltage. For each dot at (x, y), x and y rep-
resents the worst-case peak voltages estimated by the com-
mercial tool and FRAME, respectively. FRAME could re-
duce pessimism significantly, by 30.4% on average, compared
with the pruning-based industrial tool. The distribution of
the pessimism reduction amount is shown in Fig. 9(b), in
which a boxplot is used for showing the median (the line
inside the box) and interquartile range [14]. This plot shows
that FRAME typically reduces pessimism around 20-45%
for the 201 circuits we tested.
To prove further the statistical significance of our result,
we performed the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test [14], a non-
parametric test for assessing whether two sample sets come
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Figure 8: Pessimism reduction by FRAME.
from the same distribution. According to this test, we could
reject the hypothesis that two groups of worst-case peak
voltage observations (one from FRAME; the other from the
commercial tool) come from the same distribution at the
0.01% significance level with p-value of 2.85 × 10−10. This
result indicates that the observed difference in noise figures
is statistically significant and meaningful.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed FRAME, a fast and realistic method
for modeling and evaluating multiple attackers in static noise
analysis. The key difference between FRAME and conven-
tional methods is that FRAME does not prune attackers
completely but estimates the effect of all attackers without
much computational burden, leveraged by efficient track-
ing of the worst-case magnitude and alignment information
using envelopes and σ functions. According to our experi-
ments, FRAME can reduce pessimism by 30.4% on average
compared with conventional pruning-based attacker filtering
techniques. Based upon our results, we believe that FRAME
would be a very effective tool for pessimism reduction in
static noise analysis.
FRAME can be extended so that it can handle more com-
plex attacker structures such as multiple attacker chains.
For higher accuracy, it would be helpful to employ non-linear
interpolation for envelope addition and to model waveform
widths more delicately.
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